

At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:

1	SEC SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA'S PRED-
2	ATORY ECONOMIC PRACTICES IN LATIN
3	AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
4	(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con-
5	gress that—
6	(1) China's economic engagement in Latin
7	America and the Caribbean has severe long-term im-
8	plications with respect to the rule of law, democratic
9	governance, the environment, and liberties; and
10	(2) the Government of China and affiliated
11	companies pursue economic policies largely to the
12	detriment of the region's economic prosperity and
13	stability as evidenced by—
14	(A) the Coca Codo Sinclair dam, a defec-
15	tive energy project which left Ecuador in a
16	multibillion oil-for-loans debt trap and obligated
17	the country to repay China with 80 percent of
18	the country's petroleum exports;

1	(B) providing the criminal Maduro regime
2	with over \$60,000,000,000 in loans and depriv-
3	ing the Venezuelan people of resources by de-
4	manding repayment in oil shipments;
5	(C) multibillion-dollar Chinese investments
6	in critical minerals such lithium mines in Ar-
7	gentina, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico, and Brazil's
8	niobium reserves, one of the few outside loca-
9	tions of China, as well as rare earth elements;
10	(D) transactions taken by Chinese compa-
11	nies in 2000-2018, 62 percent of which were
12	mergers and strategic acquisitions obtaining
13	companies in the critical raw materials, manu-
14	facturing, and technology sectors;
15	(E) overcharging its diplomatic ally, the
16	Dominican Republic, \$19,000,000 for
17	1,000,000 doses of lifesaving COVID-19 vac-
18	cines;
19	(F) compelling Brazil and the Dominican
20	Republic to reverse prior decisions to limit
21	Huawei participation from their 5G technology
22	to receive China's COVID-19 vaccine;
23	(G) China's track record of exploiting its
24	purchasing power to compel trade dependent

1	commodity exporters such as Argentina to fa-
2	cilitate China's national interests;
3	(H) profiteering from uncompensated
4	property and assets nationalized by the Cuban
5	regime, such as the China Communications
6	Construction Company's activities in the Port
7	of Santiago;
8	(I) China's frequent practice of secretly ne-
9	gotiating free trade and special economic zones
10	within countries that boost Chinese companies
11	and displace local businesses and workers;
12	(I) commonly undermining the rule of law
13	by fostering relationships with local businesses
14	and political officials to facilitate access and
15	economic deals; and
16	(J) ZTE exporting its surveillance state
17	capabilities to the Venezuelan regime with the
18	"fatherland card", allowing the dictatorship to
19	monitor citizens finances, voting patterns, and
20	use of government welfare programs.
21	(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Con-
22	gress that the Department of State, the United States
23	Agency for International Development, and other relevant
24	executive agencies should prioritize countering the malign
25	activities described in subsection (a) and should not allow

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- 1 prohibitive United States climate or social policies to per-
- 2 mit foreign adversaries to gain further influence.

